Literature Review: Constitution-Drafting among Burma’s Democracy Movement

Citation: David C. Williams, Lessons of Experience in the Enterprise of Constitutional Design: Constitutionalism Before Constitutions: Burma’s Struggle to Build a New Order, 87 Tex. L. Rev. 1657 (June 2009)

I’ve been reading quite a bit recently about the various Burmese constitutions (1947, 1974, and 2008). However, I almost missed the democracy movement’s alternative constitution-drafting process. David C. Williams, Professor at Indiana University’s Maurer School of Law and head of the Center for Constitutional Democracy, has been working with ethnic minority groups and pro-democracy leaders for over a decade in order to help them draft alternative constitutions. As anybody who follows Burma knows, the Burmese military would never accept such documents. Indeed, as Williams acknowledges, these “constitutions” will never become legally binding documents. So why should Burmese politicians go through such constitutional exercises?
According to Williams, there have been four distinct phases in the Burmese democratic opposition’s constitutionalism. In the early 1990s, the National Coalition of the Union of Burma drafted a national, democratic constitution. However, many of the ethnic minority groups saw this draft as too Burman (as well as dominated by the Burma Lawyer’s Council). After this debacle, several groups began to draft their own state constitutions (which is when Williams and the CCD began their involvement). These ventures have varied widely in both form and substance, but have generally included some form of popular consultation and transparency.

The third phase involved an attempt to create one unified, national constitution. The democracy groups formed the Federal Constitution Drafting and Coordinating Committee to complete the task. Unfortunately, the FCDCC’s final product did not please its constituents. In particular, many thought the draft did not protect state governments nearly enough. Others simply thought it inconsistent and vague. As such, the groups are currently planning on holding “constitutional convention” this year in order to amend, alter, and rewrite the FCDCC draft into a more acceptable version.

Again, the question: why spend so much time and effort to write a constitution that will never become binding law? Williams provides some interesting observations based on his experience with the Burmese democracy movement. First, few Burmese have any experience with constitutions. While Burma was the first country in Asia to have a legal profession, today political elites in both the government and democracy movement lack the legal expertise necessary to draft a workable constitution. Indeed, the country hasn’t even had a constitution for the past 20 years. Simply going through the exercise of writing a constitution has helped democracy leaders understand the process and learn the skills of constitution-making.
Perhaps more importantly, Williams recognizes that Burma’s current problems stem from deep constitutional disagreements, particularly federalism and the status of ethnic minorities. He argues Burma’s future leaders must begin to think about these issues now rather than let them explode when the military junta does fall. In fact, because none of the political elites involved have a stake in governing under the constitution, they can focus more on constitutional ideas and design than on maximizing political power. It is unlikely any future democratic government would adopt the result of this process wholesale, but at least the leaders writing it will have thought seriously about constitutional issues.
Finally, these constitution-drafting exercises can help build trust among political elites. Whereas before, Williams describes ethnic minorities as hostile toward Burman constitutional proposals, and vice versa, the two sides have begun to envision a common future under a single constitution. Some of the participants decided they no longer needed extraordinary constitutional measures, such as the right of secession, in order to remain part of Burma. For example, all of the state constitutions had originally adopted an ethnically-based definition of citizenship. However, as the drafting process went on, they adopted a more neutral definition and guarantee all ethnic groups equal rights. Williams tells one moving story of how the Chin, having gone through these exercises, decided to no longer insist upon independence. If successful, this aspect of the project alone would reap huge benefits for a democratic Burma in the future.
As I’ve lamented before, the development community has not given enough attention or assistance to strengthening Burma’s legal capacity. Burmese students who study abroad often go into economics, development studies, political activism – but seldom law. Meanwhile, I know of no rule of law or legal-assistance programs in Burma to advise the government (although China has occasionally provided assistance on individual laws). This is a major problem precisely because so many of Burma’s development problems stem from the 50-year constitutional crisis. The country needs constitutional lawyers. In that light, I was delighted to read more about Professor Williams and CCD’s work training Burmese leaders. It definitely sounds like a worthwhile and important endeavor.
Having said that, I am a bit concerned that this alternative constitution-drafting exercise may reinforce the reluctance of the democratic opposition to participate in the government emerges from the 2010 elections. While the 2008 Constitution is many, many flaws (as I hope to detail in a later post), right now it is the only game in town. As the International Crisis Group notes, there may well be room under the new constitution for the opposition to make slight gains, particularly in influencing Hluttaw debate and blocking certain measures. Furthermore, even under any democratic government, democratic leaders will need to work with the military. I worry that too much of a focus on alternative constitutions may inflame the military’s chronic distrust of the ethnic minority groups and democracy in general. These fears might be overblown (I seriously doubt Than Shwe sits in Naypyidaw fretting over the Chin Constitution), but nonetheless I think we do have to remind ourselves that the 2008 Constitution is probably here to stay.
Hopefully, the CCD’s constitution-drafting exercises will help prepare Burma for a time when the Burmese people can chose their own constitution. Burma would really benefit if the next constituent assembly includes members who already have experience in constitution-drafting. But in the meantime, I hope somebody develops a program to educate political elites and lawyers within the country about constitutional law.

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My vision for "Rule by Hukum"

I’ve been thinking a about “Rule by Hukum” and my vision for it. Obviously, it is partially a forum for me to express my views about Southeast Asian legal issues. However, I hope eventually it will become more than that. Here are my thoughts on the purpose of “Rule by Law” and how it will fit into the comparative law blogosphere:



1) Promote knowledge and research of Southeast Asian law


Unfortunately, Southeast Asian laws, cases, and scholarship are often hard to find. A search of Lexis Nexis, the premier source for legal research in the U.S., yields only a handful of articles for Burmese law (all of which are written by just two authors). Sometimes, the most interesting work is published in relatively obscure journals, such as the Australian Journal of Asian Law, which is a great resource – if you can find it. Jurisprudence is seldom available online and not given the same weight as in the American legal system. I have found a few Southeast Asian cases (such as the Newmont case in Indonesia), and will comment some of these hidden gems.

I know many people interested in Southeast Asia have neither the time nor inclination to read all of this material, much less search for it. On the other hand, I need to read it as part of my research. Therefore, I figure I would share some of the most interesting pieces and summarize them in order to make them more accessible. Along these lines, I’ll also post reviews of any books related to Southeast Asian law or courts.

2) Provide thoughtful insights into Southeast Asian legal issues

As I’ve often mentioned, there simply isn’t much analysis of law and legal institutions in Southeast Asia, especially when compared to the thousands of trees killed for law review articles about China every year. I hope to put my legal training to good use by filling this gap with my observations (sans killing trees). I have studied international law and dozens constitutions at Georgetown, including China, Japan, and India, and interned at several legal organizations in Southeast Asia, so I can draw upon my experiences to provide a comparative perspective. In fact, you’ll probably notice that I will often draw upon the legal experiences of other Asian countries to highlight important trends or institutional innovations in Southeast Asia.

On that note, I am sure many of you have interesting insights on these issues, so please feel free to comment in the comments section. Alternatively, if you would like to contribute a longer commentary for the site, I’d be happy to post it.

3) Understand Southeast Asian theories of constitutional review

I find comparative constitutional law to be a fascinating field, but am disappointed that Southeast Asia hasn’t made much of a contribution. At Georgetown, I read cases from Canada, Germany, France, South Africa, Japan, India, and Colombia – but nothing from Southeast Asia. Most constitutional courts employ a “proportionality” test, which balances constitutional rights against governmental interests. By contrast, in the U.S., Supreme Court justices are divided between Justice Antonin Scalia’s “originalism” and Stephen Breyer’s “active liberty.”

I’m sure Southeast Asian constitutional courts have developed unique ways of interpreting constitutions. My understanding is that courts in the ASEAN-5 often alternate between expanding and restricting constitutional rights. For example, the Philippine Supreme Court has adopted U.S. case law requiring a “harm or controversy” for locus standi, but for environmental suits has followed the example of the Indian Supreme Court by practically abolishing standing requirements for public interest environmental litigation (I have written about this in greater depth elsewhere). The truth is, Western comparative law scholars simply haven’t looked to Southeast Asia. “Rule by Hukum” will attempt show just how rich the region’s constitutional experiences are.

4) Network among Southeast Asian legal scholars

Eventually, when this site has enough followers, I hope it will serve as a networking forum where scholars and lawyers interested in Southeast Asia can learn about each other. There are so few scholars in this field that sometimes being familiar with the work of 2-3 people will represent a significant proportion of the English-language literature on an ASEAN country’s legal system. I will “tag” any authors I mention in posts, so readers can read what I’ve written about them and figure out who studies which countries.

Hopefully, you all share some of these goals and will work with me and “Rule by Hukum” to promote this field. Please feel free to let me know if you have any other ideas for the blog. I look forward to blogging with you!

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Call for Papers September 30th: Inaugural East Asian Law and Society Conference

Inaugural East Asian Law and Society Conference 


Changing Socio-Legal Landscapes in East Asia:

Common Trends and Local Variations


Date: 5-6 February 2010
Venue: University of Hong Kong
Organizers: CRN East Asian Law and Society (Law and Society Association) and Faculty of Law, the University of Hong Kong
Note: All paper or panel proposals must be in English and sent by email to: Professor Hiroshi Fukurai (hfukurai@ucsc.edu) not later than 30 September 2009.

The Collaborative Research Network (CRN) East Asian Law and Society is delighted to announce that it will hold its inaugural East Asian Law and Society Conference on 5-6 February 2010 in the dynamic and vibrant city of Hong Kong. The Conference will be held at the University of Hong Kong. Scholars, legal practitioners, PhD candidates and researchers are welcome to participate. The conference theme is: Changing Socio-Legal Landscapes in East Asia: Common Trends and Local Variations. Participants do not need to be a member of the CRN East Asian Law and Society to attend the Conference.

CRN East Asian Law and Society was formed within the Law and Society Association (LSA) to provide a forum for promoting research on East Asian law and society and disseminating its findings to a wider community of socio-legal scholarship. Both Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia are covered under this CRN. It welcomes scholars researching on East Asia, and others wishing to enrich their research and theories with findings from the region. CRN East Asian Law and Society has a vision to grow into an institutional base for the holding of regional LSA meetings on a regular basis. The inaugural conference in Hong Kong is organized with this vision.

As of June 2009, confirmed keynote speakers include Professor Johannes Chan (Dean, Faculty of Law, the University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong), Professor Zhenmin Wang (Dean, School of Law, Tsinghua University, China), and Professor Malcolm Feeley (former President of the Law and Society Association).

We invite proposals for papers and panels that are related to the conference theme (Changing Socio-Legal Landscapes in East Asia: Common Trends and Local Variations) or fall within any of the following streams on East Asian law and society:

  • Legal Education and Training 
  • Legal and Quasi-legal Professions 
  • Dispute Resolution and Civil Litigation 
  • Lay Participation and Other Forms of Democratic Justice 
  • Gender in Law 
  • Criminal Justice 
  • Constitutional Law


Any papers or panels related to the conference theme (Changing Socio-Legal Landscapes in East Asia: Common Trends and Local Variations) are welcome, whether or not falling under any of the above-listed streams.

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Book Review: Administrative Law and Governance in Asia

Administrative Law and Governance in Asia: Comparative Perspectives (Routledge Law in Asia) is one of the more recent in Routledge’s excellent “Law in Asia” series. This volume, edited by Tom Ginsberg and Albert H.Y. Chen, is also one of the most interesting in the series, dealing primarily with powers of judicial review in administrative and constitutional contexts.


First, a few general observations about the book:
Administrative Law and Governance in Asia represents a serious effort by top experts in the field. Tom Ginsburg of University of Chicago is well-known for his scholarship on judicial review in Asia, particularly his excellent Judicial Review in New DemocraciesRandall Peerenboom has famously cautioned against imposing Western legal norms upon the Chinese legal system. John Gillespie‘s scholarship focuses mostly on commercial law in Vietnam and is (at least in my opinion) one of the top three Western scholars studying Vietnamese law. Stewart Fenwick, associated with Tim Lindsey’s Asia Law Group, has worked on judicial reform in Indonesia for several years. For this reason alone, the book is worth reading to become familiar with the scholars and their work.

Compilations of this sort are in danger of simply reprinting the laws and judicial decisions from individual countries, rather than providing context and analysis. I remember one book about competition policy in Asia that essentially reprinted each country’s anti-monopoly law. Needless to say, in an age when I can find the important legislation from ASEAN countries online, that type of book is useless. Fortunately, Administrative Law and Governance in Asia by and large avoids this trap. The authors analyze on judicial institutions, not just the text of laws. They really provide a sense of the success of judicial review in the country as practiced. Several of the articles provide amazing data on courts in Southeast Asia that I haven’t found elsewhere, from appeal rates to caseloads. Of course, not all of the articles rise to this level of excellence, but most do.

Now, for the bad. As a Burma specialist, I am always disappointed that the Routledge series does not include a chapter on Burma. Granted, the series also omits Cambodia, Laos, Brunei, and East Timor, but  Burma generates significantly more interest (as can be gleaned from the excitement over Obama’s new Burma policy). I suspect the editors either could not find anybody qualified to write such a chapter, or decided that Burma’s legal system had not yet developed sufficiently to make it worthy of inclusion. On the first point, all I can say is that hopefully in 10 years or so I can fill that gap and write those chapters. On the second point, it is true that Burma has not had any mechanism for judicial review since the 1962 coup. However, that certainly doesn’t mean Burma doesn’t have administrative law. In fact, I think Burma could serve as a useful counterpoint as the prototype patrimonial legal system. Also, there are some interesting provisions in the new constitution regarding judicial review, such as the constitutional tribunal. I will keep my fingers crossed for future volumes. [As a non-ASEAN side note, I also hope Routledge finds a way to include Mongolia, which has a dynamic constitutional court. I know several of the authors in this volume have experience with Mongolian courts].

A more serious concern I had with the book was its bifurcated nature and failure to focus on administrative law. “Judicial review” can encompass many ideas, but lawyers most often consider the power of courts to determine the government’s compliance with 1) the constitution, or 2) superior statutes and regulations. While the basic institutional concept of judicial review is the same for both practices, they involve very different fields of substantive law. Constitutional review often involves human rights, elections, presidential power – the “hot” topics in law. On the other hand, administrative review deals with more technical fields, such as regulation of public utilities – the classes most law students dreaded.

Unfortunately, this split arises throughout the book and is never fully integrated into one idea. Some of the chapters seem almost like two separate articles, with one half addressing administrative courts and the other constitutional courts. Some authors even wrote each half in a different style or using a different frame of analysis. Sometimes, the switch is jarring, For example, Gan Ching Chuan’s article on Malaysia begins by comparing the Court of Appeal’s willingness to protect fundamental rights with the Indian Supreme Court, but ends with a discussion of Malaysian public utilities. I found both halves interesting, but would prefer the first half expanded in a book dedicated exclusively to constitutional review in Asia.

There is a question of how different these concepts of administrative and constitutional review really are. After all, both address the power of judiciary to hold the state apparatus accountable to the law. However, there is an important difference: political elites in have viewed administrative review as less threatening than constitutional review. Several authoritarian countries in the region, from Communist China to Suharto’s Indonesia, created administrative courts with limited powers of judicial review. Both regimes used administrative law to handle the increased complexities of modern economies, as well as to rationalize the law. However, both governments resisted (and China’s still resists) any sort of constitutional review. Indonesia’s Administrative Courts during the 1990s were able to make bold decisions in part because elites viewed them as peripheral, but the country only established the Mahkamah Konstitusi during the reformasi era. In short, because elites in the legal systems treat these concepts separately, I think it would have been useful to separate these two fields a bit more clearly throughout the book.

Now, since this is a blog about Southeast Asia, here are short reviews of the chapters dealing with Southeast Asian (and Chinese) judicial review:


1) More law, less courts: Legalized governance, judicialization, and dejudicialization in China – Randall Peerenboom


Peerenboom’s scholarship has emphasized that we should not expect the rule of law in China (or elsewhere in Asia) to resemble Western conceptions of the rule of law. Because of its political and cultural context, China has focused on administrative remedies to handle citizen complaints. He also details the “dejudicialization” over the past few years, noting that courts, which are expensive and do not have autonomous enforcement powers, may not be the most relevant forum for most Chinese citizens. The Chinese government has opened some mechanisms for administrative accountability (notably the Xinfang system), but has in recent years rolled back any attempts at judicial review. In a sense, these developments provide an interesting contrast to the rest of the countries covered in the book.

2) The juridification of administartive complaints and review in Vietnam – John Gillespie


Of all the essays in the book, Gillespie’s chapter on Vietnam does the best job of staying focused on administrative law. He explores various theories to explain why Vietnam has moved ever-so-slowly toward judicialization of administrative complaints. However, more interesting are the “non-legal” administrative mechanisms. Local firms and elites prefer these alternatives since, as domestic actors who understand the system, they have an advantage over foreign competition. However, this comes at the cost of weaker courts. Domestic actors appear more hesitant to use courts and potentially damage their relationships with local officials. Furthermore, as might be expected in a Communist legal system, judges have been unwilling to challenge the state. The Supreme Court even ordered judges to avoid “interfering with the mechanisms of government.” After reading this chapter, I became anxious to read Mark Sidel’s new book on Vietnam’s constitution.

3) The emergence of administrative justice in Thailand after the 1997 Constitution – Peter Leyland


This chapter had the distinct misfortunate of going to press right after the 2006 coup, which ousted Prime Minister Thaksin. As such, its greatest value is historical. Having said that, this is an especially useful chapter for American lawyers to read because it shows the influence of European legal theory on Thai law. Leyland also discusses the principles of administrative review, such as abuse of discretion – although proportionality was not among them.

He ends the chapter with two brief case studies. These I found less useful. On the one hand, Leyland states that political elites have allowed the Administrative Court to act independently because they view it as having less of a role in controversial matters, yet both case studies involved the media and Egat, assets dear to Thaksin during his rule. Furthermore, as was apparent last year, the Constitutional Court has been independent enough to topple the Thai cabinet. The Thai judiciary as a whole, not just the Administrative Courts, has a reputation for professionalism and honesty unmatched anywhere else in Southeast Asia (except Singapore). Leyland only hints at the deeper roots of the judiciary’s strength near the very end of his article when he notes that the judicial appointment process focuses on merit and that the court’s finances is ring-fenced. I wish he had developed those points a bit further.

Of course, since publication, the Thai military enacted a new constitution and the Constitutional Court has changed significantly. Check out Tom Ginsburg’s recent article about Thai courts for an update.

4) Administrative law and judicialized governance in Malaysia: the Indian connection – Gan Ching Chuan


As I mentioned above, this article definitely felt bifurcated. I found the first half an interesting overview of developments in constitutional review among the Courts of Appeal. Chuan describes a moderately liberalizing trend during the late 1990s up until 2007, when the Federal Court imposed more a restrictive interpretation on fundamental rights and access to courts. Unfortunately, he never teases that tension out to explain why the Federal Court butted heads with the Court of Appeals. Was there political pressure from above? Did the composition of the court change during the mid-2000s? I would like to have seen the article continue along these lines rather than venture off into public utility law for the second half.

I have been encouraging Southeast Asian lawyers to look at constitutional law elsewhere for ideas and inspiration. However, I also felt Chuan’s comparison to India might not be the most appropriate. India’s Supreme Court has become a very aggressive veto player and vocal in its advocacy on behalf of public interest causes. As I’ve argued elsewhere for Pakistan, this may not be the best model to follow. Unlike India’s vibrant democracy, elites still have an outsized influence over Malaysian politics. Even though Malaysian courts will occasionally borrow Indian case law, as recent judicial scandals indicate Malaysia’s courts are, at best, compromised. Malaysia’s courts must also deal with the increasing influence of Islamic law and a society deeply divided among ethnic lines – problems India has, but to a far more limited extent. Furthermore, India’s Supreme Court is actually on the global extreme in terms of theories of constitutional interpretation. Most Western courts would reject India’s views on substantive equality for example. Thus, I do not believe Malaysian constitutional lawyers should set an outlier like India as its goal.

5) “Government by judiciary” in the Philippines: ideological and doctrinal framework – Raul C. Pangalangan


Pangalangan’s article isn’t focused on administrative law at all, but rather is an exposition of constitutional review in Philippines. At times he loses a scholarly objectivity and shows his sympathies toward judicial activism. Nonetheless, the article makes two important points that anybody interested in the Philippines should (and often doesn’t) realize.

First, the 1987 Constitution reflects the protectionist and pro-poor policy ideology of the 1986 People Power movement. It includes downright socialist provisions on national ownership of strategic economic sectors that the Arroyo administration tried, but failed, to amend. Unfortunately for the country, the drafters succeeded in freezing the constitution in place, which has hampered its competitiveness in the international economy.

Second, the Philippine Supreme Court has become a vocal and progressive veto player in the government. The court demonstrated this late last year when it struck down the Mindanao peace settlement. However, as Pangalangan argues, it has also acted as a champion of the 1987 Constitution’s progressive ideals. The court has liberalized standing requirements for public interest litigants and eschewed legal formalism. Unlike most Southeast Asia Supreme Courts, it is often involved in the most controversial issues of the day.

Having spent some time in the Philippines working on public interest law, I part ways with Pangalangan in assessing the court’s success The Philippine Supreme Court is a lone progressive voice in a sea of conservative elites. It succeeds in striking down laws when, as with the Mindanao settlement, a significant segment of the elite has something to gain. When the Supreme Court goes against elite interests, as with environmental and human rights cases, the court appears impotent. Despite Chief Justice Reynato Puno’s valiant efforts, the judiciary still has not convicted any officials for the spate of extrajudicial killings. I also have gotten the sense that the Supreme Court’s progressive rulings on environmental law have not filtered down to the lower courts, which still require traditional legal standing. Thus, the Supreme Court is only partially successful as the guardian of the Constitution. I suspect Pangalangan would agree with this assessment, but I wish he had spent more time discussing the limits of judicialization as well as the court’s doctrine.

6) Administrative law and judicial review in Indonesia: the search for accountability – Stewart Fenwick


This is easily one of the best articles in the entire volume. I thought I had read everything about Indonesia’s courts in the English language, but was obviously wrong. It is packed with information and data that are unavailable anywhere else. I suspect Fenwick obtained much of the data during his years as a consultant with Tim Lindsey’s Asia Law Group. 

One statistic that struck me – 98% of cases in the court system deal with criminal matters, and of those over 90% concern minor traffic accidents. In other words, civil litigation is almost non-existent! This has very important consequences for ongoing judicial reform projects in the country. Often reformers have focused on reducing the backlog, but there is also a need to reduce the number of appeals to the Supreme Court. If so many cases really deal with such petty issues, the courts should establish a certiorari system to make appeals discretionary, not by right.

[Note: there is a chapter about Singapore’s courts in this book, but I haven’t gotten around to reading it. Sorry, Singapore!]

Overall, I still think this is a great book. The scholarship is excellent and I have used several of the articles in my research. I find both administrative and constitutional law fascinating, so on a personal level I enjoyed it. However, I hope Routledge considers dedicating an entire book to constitutional law in Asia soon (there are some attempts at such a book, but I think the subject deserves treatment from Routledge’s Law in Asia series). I am excited about its New Courts in Asia, coming out later this year. Hopefully that volume will cover constitutional courts.

I also highly recommend Ginsburg’s Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases.

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ASEAN can take a leaf out of African Union

Here is a recent op-ed I wrote about ASEAN’s new Human Rights Body. It was published on Mizzima, as well as Bernama, Malaysiakini, and a few other news sites…

Mizzima News
Wednesday, September 16, 2009


As the Association of Southeast Asian Nations prepares to appoint its first set of human rights commissioners to the new ASEAN Human Rights Body at the 15th ASEAN Summit this October, the commission itself faces skepticism and uncertainty about its future. Human rights activists allege that ASEAN stripped the commission of any teeth in order to appease perennial human rights violators such as Burma.

Defenders counter that, given ASEAN’s concerns over national sovereignty (the infamous “ASEAN Way”), the result was a necessary political compromise. Indeed, comparing the ASEAN Human Rights Body to the European Court of Human Rights would seem unfair, given that Europe consists exclusively of liberal democracies. However, even if we look to the rest of the developing world, ASEAN still has much to learn about much about establishing an effective human rights body from – of all places – Africa.


Historically Africa has had more petty dictators, more xenophobic governments, more genocides, and more overall human rights problems than ASEAN. Despite these challenges, the African Union has developed a fairly advanced human rights system. During the 1980s, African leaders adopted the Banjul Charter on Human and People’s Rights. Since then, the region has also adopted treaties protecting children’s and women’s rights, as well as a charter on democratic governance. Africa’s human rights system exists not only on paper, but also has teeth: the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights.

African Union member countries elect 11 commissioners for a six-year renewable term. These commissioners are independent from their respective governments and must be human rights experts of the “highest reputation.” Impressively, the Commission has both the mandate and political will to rule against African governments for discrimination, free speech, arbitrary detention, torture, and a variety of other rights violations. When a military junta still ruled Nigeria in the late 1990s, the Commission ordered the government to release a journalist who had been arrested without a warrant and prosecuted in a military tribunal. Several years ago, it ruled that the Republic of Guinea violated the Banjul Charter by inciting solders to evict, rape, and torture Sierra Leonean refugees. The Commission has interpreted African human rights broadly, finding that a state of emergency does not justify violating human rights. It has even ventured into political disputes, condemning the government of Mauritania for dissolving the opposition party in 2000.

Admittedly, the African human rights system is far from perfect. The African Commission has no independent enforcement mechanisms. Some countries do comply voluntarily, but, even when governments refuse to, a favourable decision from the commission can constitute a powerful moral victory. Also, the Commission’s docket is backlogged since it can only meet for two 15-day sessions each year. However, the Commission has taken important steps toward not only supporting individual human rights victims, but also promoting human rights ideals throughout the continent. Despite Africa’s sensitivity over their national sovereignty after being colonized by Europe, many African governments now consider it appropriate to intervene in order to protect human rights. Last year, when Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe won an election through violence and fraud, the Southern African Development Community strongly criticized his actions and successfully pressured him to form a coalition government with the opposition. In 2005, the African Union even suspended Togo in response to an unconstitutional seizure of power, which convinced the government to call new elections. Moreover, the African Union is currently establishing a stronger African Court of Justice and Human Rights to hear human rights cases. As a result, according to the U.S. think-tank Freedom House, Africans on the whole currently enjoy more civil and political freedom than Southeast Asians. While Africa still faces many challenges, human rights violations are no longer accepted as the norm thanks in part to efforts of the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights.

By contrast, ASEAN has yet to adopt a single human rights treaty and struggles to condemn gross rights violations committed by its member. Unlike African human rights treaties, neither the ASEAN Charter nor the ASEAN Human Rights Body’s Terms of Reference detail specific rights, but rather list vague principles, such as non-discrimination and the rule of law. Thus, it is not even clear whether Southeast Asians possess the same human rights that Africans currently enjoy. Moreover, the ASEAN Human Rights Body will not be nearly as strong as its African counterpart. It cannot hear individual complaints from ASEAN citizens whose rights have been violated. In addition, the commission has no power to monitor or investigate abuses in ASEAN countries. Rather, its main function appears to be merely promoting human rights awareness. The ASEAN Terms of Reference also provides little guidance on the qualifications for commissioners – a far cry from the Africa Union’s requirement that its commissioners be human rights experts of the “highest reputation.” ASEAN’s commissioners will have no independence, serving merely as “representatives” of their respective governments. Should a commissioner become too vocal, the government can remove him at its discretion at any time.

ASEAN and the Africa Union are two very different regions, but nonetheless the comparison provides some useful lessons as ASEAN prepares to appoint the first human rights commissioners. First of all, a strong regional human body can coexist with political diversity, conservative cultures, and national sovereignty. The African Commission hears individual complaints from human rights victims who live under authoritarian governments. This may embarrass some politicians, but has certainly not threatened the regimes of dictators such as Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe. It is likewise difficult to see how a stronger ASEAN Human Rights Body would topple Burma’s Than Shwe. Indeed, part of the African Commission’s success derives from using nuanced legal interpretations to balance the concerns of sovereign governments with the imperative of protecting human rights. For example, it requires human rights victims to work within their country’s own justice system before appealing to the Commission. This allows governments the first chance to redress any human rights violations and save face.

Rather than trying to find a similar compromise, ASEAN seems to have simply hid behind the mantra of the “ASEAN Way.” Southeast Asian leaders should take a closer look at other regional human rights bodies, particularly Africa’s, in order to learn how to balance meaningful protection of human rights with national sovereignty. In the longer run, doing so will help create a stronger ASEAN Community and give both ASEAN and its member governments more legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens. In fact, given Africa’s relative experience with human rights, perhaps we will soon see African Union legal advisors sent to Southeast Asia in order to help the ASEAN Human Rights Body comply with international human rights standards.


http://www.mizzima.com/edop/commentary/2769-asean-can-take-a-leaf-out-of-african-union-.html

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